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WHO IS AN "OFFICER" FOR PURPOSES OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934COLBY v. KLUNE REVISITED
by WILLIAM P. HURLEY*

T

I.

INTRODUCTION

HE question of who is an "officer" of a corporation would appear, at first blush, not worthy of extended discussion inasmuch
as state statutes1 and by-laws of corporations usually set forth what
positions in the corporation are to be considered officerships. Individuals holding these positions would normally be the officers of the
corporation. However, who is an officer for purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 (1934 Act) cannot be ascertained from state
statutes or corporation by-laws, nor determined from the conferring of
officer titles by the board of directors of a corporation. Nor can
reliance be entirely placed upon the definition of officer found in rule
3b-2 3 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
1934 Act.
This Article will discuss the history of the meaning of the word
officer for purposes of the 1934 Act, by comparing judicial decisions
concerning the meaning of officer under the Act with the Commission's
definition contained in rule 3b-2. There has been, and continues to be
considerable uncertainty as to the meaning of officer for purposes of
applying the provisions of section 16, 4 as well as other sections of the

* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Hurley received his B.A. from Iona College, his J.D.
from Fordham Law School, and his LL.M. in taxation from New York University Graduate
School of Law. Mr. Hurley is a member of Cusack & Stiles, New York City.
1. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 142 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 715 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1974). See generally 6 Z. Cavitch,
Business Organizations § 128.01 (1975) which lists the state statutes specifying the officers
required to serve a corporation.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7ga-hh (1970).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1975).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970) which provides: "(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an
exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director or
an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on
a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant to
section 781(g) of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or
officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is registered on a national
securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of
which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month
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1934 Act. The Article concludes by offering a proposed solution to the
problem.
II.

HISTORY OF THE DEFINITION OF "OFFICER"

UNDER

THE 1934 ACT

Although the 1934 Act defines the term director, 5 it does not define
the term officer. This failure to define officer may have been a
legislative oversight. It is possible, however, that the Congress believed it was using a familiar word in its ordinary and generally
accepted sense according to the common usage of the day in the legal
and financial worlds, thus obviating the need for definition. 6 The 1934
Act's legislative history 7 is silent on this point.
thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file
with the
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file
with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and
such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless
such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such
beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to
recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if
the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fall
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection." See Comment, Who is an "Officer" Under Section 16(b)-Who Knows?, 12 San Diego
L. Rev. 378 (1975).
5. "The term 'director' means any director of a corporation or any person performing similar
functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(7) (1970).
6. In Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959), Judge Medina
noted that the phrase "class of any equity security," as used in section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, had
not been defined by the Congress. Judge Medina stateck "There is no prior case law on this point,
no statutory history to guide us and no legislative definition to which we can refer. But the very
absence of congressional direction or guidance suggests that the Congress thought the meaning of
the phrase 'class of any equity security' was reasonably clear and it was using familiar terms in
their ordinary and generally accepted sense according to the common usage of the day in the legal
and financial worlds." Id. at 262. Judge Medina concluded that the court had no alternative but
to follow the common usage of the word, while relying on state law in order to interpret the word
"class" for purposes of the section. Id. at 263.
7. H.R. Rep. Nos. 1383, 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Rep. Nos. 792, 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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The Commission, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by
section 3(b) of the 1934 Act "to define technical, trade, accounting, and
other terms . . .,"8 issued rule 3b-2 defining officer as follows:
The term "officer" means a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary comptroller,
and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers.9

This rule would appear to define officer for all purposes of the 1934
Act. 10
In 1940 the Commission's General Counsel released Securities Exchange Act Release 268711 in order to clarify the status under rule 3b-2

of assistant officers, such as assistant secretaries, assistant treasurers
and assistant comptrollers, for purposes of reporting securities holdings
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(b) (Supp. 4, Aug. 1975), amending is U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1970).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1975). For a general discussion of the history of the rule see 2 L.
Loss, Securities Regulation 1091-94 (2d ed. 1961) and S L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3052-53
(Supp., 2d ed. 1969).
A different definition of the word "officer," as used in the 1934 Act, has been issued by the
Bureau of the Comptroller of the Currency (12 C.F.R. § 11.2(o) (1975)), the Federal Reserve
System (Id. § 206.2(o) (1975)), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (Id.
§ 335.2(o) (1975)). The FDIC definition provides: "The term 'officer' means a Chairman of the
Board of Directors, Vice Chairman of the Board, Chairman of the Executive Committee,
President, Vice President (except as indicated in the next sentence), Cashier, Treasurer, Secretary, Comptroller, and any other person who participates in major policy-making functions of the
bank. In some banks (particularly banks with officers bearing titles such as Executive Vice
President, Senior Vice President, or First Vice President as well as a number of 'Vice Presidents),
some or all 'Vice Presidents' do not participate in major policy-making functions, and such
persons are not officers for the purpose of this Part." For purposes of the Bureau of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve System, the policy making test of the
second sentence is applicable only to vice presidents. Id. § 11.101 (1975); Id. § 206.101 (1975).
10. For example, corporations subject to the provisions of the 1934 Act and their corporate
personnel would ordinarily use rule 3b-2 to determine whether such personnel are officers for
purposes of: (a) filing reports (Forms 3 and 4) under section 16(a) of the 1934 Act; (b) the insider
trading liability and short sale provisions of section 16(b) and section 16(c) of the 1934 Act; (c)
disclosing information concerning officers in (i) registration statements, e.g., Form 10, Form 20,
filed under sections 12(b) or (g) of the 1934 Act, (ii) reports, e.g., current report on Form 8-K,
annual reports on Forms 10-K, 12-K, 14-K and 20-K, filed under sections 13 or 15(d) of the 1934
Act, and (-ii) proxy statements filed under section 14 of the 1934 Act. For purposes of the Form
10-K (annual report), the Commission has defined an "executive officer" as follows: "The term
'executive officer' means the president, secretary, treasurer, and vice president in charge of a
principal business function (such as sales, administration or finance) and any other person who
performs similar policy making functions for the registrant" 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 31,103,
at 22,060 (1974) (Item 8, Instruction 2 of Form 10-K (annual report)). The Commission used the
same definition in defining "executive officer" (except the word "issuer" is substituted for the word
"registrant") for purposes of information to be contained in the annual report to shareholders. See
17 C.F.Rt § 240.14a-3(b)(7) (1975) and note thereto.
11. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2687 (Nov. 16, 1940), 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep.
26,055-58, at 19,062 (1975) [hereinafter Release No. 2687].

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

on Forms 3 and 4 under section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, and for purposes
of filing reports under section 30(f) of the Investment Company Act of
1940.12 The release provided:
"Officer" is defined in the instructions to the forms to mean president, vice president,
treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed
by the foregoing officers. It is the opinion of the General Counsel of the Commission
that an assistant would be an "officer" if his chief is so inactive that the assistant is
really performing his chiefs functions. However, an assistant, although performing
some functions which might be those of his chief, would not be an "officer" so long as
these duties were under the supervision of his chief. Temporary absence or brief
vacation of an officer during which an assistant performs the officer's duties would not
constitute the assistant an "officer." Subject to the foregoing, assistant treasurers,
assistant secretaries, and assistant comptrollers, for example, are not to be considered
"officers" for the purposes of this definition.13

In 1949, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Colby v. Klune, 14
significantly altered the meaning of officer for purposes of section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act. Until that decision, corporate counsel desiring to
determine whether a corporate employee was an officer under section
16(b) of the 1934 Act needed to consider only rule 3b-2 and the opinion
of the Commission's General Counsel.
Colby, a stockholder of the Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, sued Klune, a "Production Manager" for Twentieth Century at
its studio in Los Angeles. Under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, Colby
sought recovery of profits realized by Klune from his purchase of
Twentieth Century common shares, pursuant to the exercise of a stock
option granted him by Twentieth Century, and his subsequent sale of
the shares within less than six months. Colby claimed that Klune, in
his capacity as production manager, performed the duties of an officer
within the meaning of rule 3b-2 and that the profits realized by Klune
on the sale of shares within a six month period were recoverable by
Twentieth Century.
On cross motions for summary judgment, Judge Conger of the
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that since
Klune did not perform the duties of an officer of Twentieth Century as
prescribed by its by-laws, he was not an officer under rule 3b-2 subject
to section 16(b) liability. In his opinion, Judge Conger stated:
The by-laws of the defendant corporation define the duties of its officers, and Klune
does not perform them, vicariously or otherwise. He is Production Manager, and
although an officer might conceivably perform these duties, he is not acting as an
12.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1970).

13.
14.

Release No. 2687, supra note 11.
178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
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officer when he performs them; he is acting as an officer when he performs the duties
prescribed by the by-laws.S

Judge Conger, in reaching his decision, considered statements contained in the affidavits submitted to the court which indicated that
Klune was a production manager who supervised the business details
incident to the production of films. It was his function to avoid cost
overruns and to procure physical facilities or employees necessary for
the production of the fflms. 16 The court concluded:
The excerpts that are quoted above adequately state the functions of Klune as plaintiff
sees them. In effect they show Kiune to be a superior combination of purchasing agent
and personnel manager. No doubt the functions he performs and the responsibilities he
assumes would be fit for the president or other officers of many corporations. But Rule
X-3B-2 cited before cannot mean functions performed by officers of
any corporation. It
7
must necessarily apply to officers of the corporation involved.1

The court rejected plaintiff's argument that Klune's position gave
him special knowledge of corporate affairs so as to place him in the
category of an "insider" subject to section 16(b) liability. Judge Conger
stated that Congress imposed liability under section 16(b) only upon
directors, officers and more than ten percent beneficial owners. He
claimed that it was not the intent of Congress to impose section 16(b)
liability upon highly paid employees or any employee with access to
inside information.1 8
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
district court.1 9 The Second Circuit rejected the district court's reliance
on the by-laws of a corporation to determine who is an officer for
purposes of liability under section 16(b) and held that it was error for
the district court to grant summary judgment on affidavits since there
was a triable issue of fact "turning on credibility" as to whether Klune
20
was an officer.
In his opinion for the Second Circuit, Judge Frank was uncertain as
to whether rule 3b-2 was validly issued by the Commission. He stated:
Assuming for the moment that Rule X-3b-2, issued by the S. E. C., is not authorized
by the statute, we construe "officer," as used in Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, thus: It includes, inter alia, a corporate employee performing important
executive duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging these duties,
to obtain confidential information about the company's affairs that would aid him if he
15.
16.
17.
18.

83 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161-62.

19.
20.

Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
Id. at 873.
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engaged in personal market transactions. It is immaterial how his functions are
labelled or how defined in the by-laws, or that he does or does not act under tile
supervision of some other corporate representative. As we think that, at this stage of
the case, it is well to reserve decision concerning the statutory power of the S. E. C. to
issue Rule X-3b-2, we think that the plaintiff should be allowed at a trial to produce
oral testimony in open court (by examination or cross-examination of witnesses), or
other evidence, relevant under the foregoing definition of officer."1

The court further stated:
It may be that the S. E. C. had such statutory authority to issue the Rule that it binds
the courts. Even so, there remains much room for inquiring into the facts at a trial.
For the functions of a "vice-president" or "comptroller" are not so well settled as to be
self-evident, and there is need for evidence concerning those functions. Under that
Rule as we interpret it, it does not matter whether or how the by-laws of this
particular company define the duties of such officers. The question is what this
particular employee was called upon to do in this particular company, i.e., the relation
between his authorized activities and those of this corporation. Again, under this
22 Rule,
it is not decisive whether or not some other person supervised his work.

Judge Frank stated in a footnote 23 that the court disagreed with,
and would not follow the opinion of the Commission's General Counsel
(contained in the 1940 release, Securities Exchange Act Release
2687),24 as to the meaning of officer under rule 3b-2.
The Commission filed a memorandum with the court which supported the Second Circuit's view that there was much room under rule
3b-2 for inquiring into the functions of the corporate employee to
determine whether he was an officer for section 16(b) purposes. 25 The
Commission noted in its memorandum that rule 3b-2 did not attempt
to create any general criteria and that section 16 was designed to deal
with substance rather than form. The Commission stated in its
memorandum that "it is significant that the employee has or has not
'responsibility for the policy of at least a substantial segment of the
corporation's affairs' and participates 'in executive councils of the
corporation as an officer.' "26 The Second Circuit thought that the
district court should receive evidence on this issue, while reserving
27
decision as to its legal significance until after the trial.
The Second Circuit did not decide that rule 3b-2 was invalid; rather,
it directed the district court to disregard the enumeration of officers
listed in the by-laws of the corporation and to focus on Klune's
21. Id. (footnotes omitted).
22. Id. at 875 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id. at 875 n.15.
24.

Release No. 2687, supra note 11.

25. 178 F.2d at 875.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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corporate duties in determining whether he was an officer for purposes
of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. An analysis of the Second Circuit's
decision discloses that the district court would have to use the following criteria (hereinafter referred to as the Colby criteria) in determining
whether Klune was an officer for purposes of section 16(b): (a) Likelihood of obtaining confidential information-were Klune's "executive
duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging these
duties, to obtain confidential information about the company's affairs
28
that would aid him if he engaged in personal market transactions[?]'
(b) Responsibility for corporate policy-did Klune have responsibility
for making policy determinations concerning at least a substantial
segment of the corporation's affairs?2 9 (c) Participationin executive
councils-did Klune participate in the executive councils of Twentieth
Century?3 0 Thus, contrary to Judge Conger's objective views that
officers of a corporation, for purposes of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act,
are those persons enumerated in the by-laws of a corporation, the
Second Circuit chose to introduce the use of broader and more
subjective criteria in determining the meaning of officer under section
16(b).
In 1952, the Commission issued Securities Exchange Act Release
4718,31 in which the Commission proposed to amend rule 3b-2 by
incorporating the Second Circuit's access to confidential information
test into rule 3b-2's definition of officer. The Commission stated in that
release:
The term "officer" means a president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller,
and any other corporate employee performing executive duties of such characterthat he
would be likely, in discharginghis duties, to obtain confidential information about his
company's affairs, and any other person who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by any of the
32
foregoing persons.

Corporate personnel responding to the invitation to comment were
unanimous in opposing the revision, 33 and the Commission, in Securi28.

Id. at 873.

29. Id. at 875.
30. Id. Judge Frank mentioned (b) and (c) as possible tests for determining officer status
where rule 3b-2 was assumed to be a valid regulation. However, in light of section 16(b)'s

purpose-the prevention of the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
reason of a statutory insider's relationship to an issuer-the (b) and (c) tests could be viewed as
supplementing (a), inasmuch as (b) and (c) would assist in establishing whether the employee's
executive duties were "of such character that he would be likely, in discharging these duties, to
obtain confidential information about the company's affairs .

31.

. . ."

Id. at 873.

SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4718 (June 18. 1952).

32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
385, 399 n.58 (1953).
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ties Exchange Act Release 4754,34 withdrew the proposed amendment.
In withdrawing the proposal the Commission recognized the uncertainties created by the amendment.
The Commission has concluded not to adopt the proposed revision of rule X-3B-2 as
set forth in its notice, dated June 18, 1952 (Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4718,
June 18, 1952). The comment received upon this proposal has convinced the Commission that adoption of the proposed revision would lead to undue uncertainties as to just
what persons are to be treated as "officers" for purposes of sections 16 (a) and 16 (b), as
well as sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Act. It has concluded that it should adhere to the
definition in rule X-3B-2 as presently in effect, despite the intimations in the opinion of
the Court in Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, that the existing definition may be too
narrow. The Commission is advised that that case is still awaiting trial upon remand
to the district court. See also Lockheed Aircraft Corporation v. Rathman
35

It is interesting to note that the Commission cited Lockheed Aircrqft
Corp. v. Rathman3 6 without further comment, even though Judge
Byrne, in rendering his decision in that case, stated that the Second

Circuit's statement casting doubt on the validity of rule 3b-2 was the
"purest form of dictum. ' 37 The Commission, if it decided to support
the validity of its own rule, could have relied on the opinion of Judge
Byrne. Instead, the Commission, while leaving the rule in effect, chose
to leave to the courts the determination of who is an officer, not only
for section 16(b) purposes, but for all purposes of the 1934 Act.
Although the Commission is continuing in effect the existing rule X-3B-2 as the
Commission's definition of "officer," it is recognized that the ultimate determination of
what constitutes an "officer" must be made by the courts and that the opinion in Colby
v. Klune . . . indicates the possibility that the provisions of the Act applicable to
officers may be held to reach a broader class of persons than might otherwise appear
from the definition contained in rule X-3B-2. Persons inquiring as to their statutory
responsibilities will continue to be advised of this possibility. 38

Since Colby was concerned with defining officer solely for purposes of
section 16(b) of the Act, the Commission's extension of the uncertainty
as to the meaning of officer into other provisions of the 1934 Act is a
startling result.

Unlike the Second Circuit's decision in Colby, a California district
court upheld the validity of rule 3b-2 in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
4
Rathman39 and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754 (Sept. 24, 1952).
Id.
106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
Id.at 813.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754 (Sept. 24, 1952).
106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953). In Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
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In Rathman, the court, basing its decision entirely on an analysis of
rule 3b-2, found that Rathman, an assistant treasurer of Lockheed,
was not an officer of Lockheed for purposes of section 16(b) liability.
Rathman, as assistant treasurer, had purchased Lockheed stock pursuant to a stock option plan and had sold the stock on the same day.
Lockheed subsequently sued Rathman to recover the profit from the
transaction. Judge Byrne reviewed rule 3b-2 and found that since an
Assistant Treasurer was not among the officers enumerated by the

rule, Lockheed had to establish that Rathman was an officer under
that portion of the rule which states that an officer is any " 'other
person who performs for an issuer functions corresponding to those
performed by [the officers enumerated in the rule].' "41 Judge Byrne

interpreted the word "corresponding" to mean "similar,"4 2 so that the
quoted portion of the rule was aimed at persons who performed

functions similar to the officers recited in the rule such as a president,
vice-president, treasurer, etc. The court concluded that the
"other person" provision does not relate to an employee who assists one of the
enumerated officers or performs any of the functions of his office during his absence,
but relates to an officer, regardless of title, the functions
of whose office, correspond to
43
those performed by one of the enumerated officers.

Judge Byrne then found that Lockheed had a treasurer during the
entire tenure of Rathman's employment and that Rathman's functions
as an assistant treasurer did not "correspond" to those performed by

the treasurer. Therefore, Rathman was not an officer of Lockheed
within the meaning of section 16(b) or rule 3b-2. Judge Byrne further

found that, even if Rathman were held to be an officer, he would be
within the "good faith" provision of section 23(a) of the 1934 Act, thus
avoiding section 16(b) liability. 44 The evidence showed that Rathman
1973), Judge Bauman stated that the Rathman and Campbell decisions upholding the validity of
rule 3b-2 were of little precedential value since an assistant treasurer, which was the position
subject to question, is not a position included in the rule's definition of officer. Id. at 486.
But see note 82 infra.
41. 106 F. Supp. at 812, quoting rule 3b-2.
42. Id. at 812.
43. Id. at 813.
44. Id. at 814. Section 23(a)(1) of the 1934 Act provides: "The Commission, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the other agencies enumerated in section 78c(a)(34)
of this title shall each have power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary... for
the execution of the functions vested in them by this title, and may for such purposes classify
persons, securities, transactions, statements, applications, reports, and other matters within their
respective jurisdictions.. . . No provision of this chapter imposing any liability shall apply to
any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with a rule, regulation, or order of the
Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, other agency enumerated in
section 78c(a)(34) of this title, any self-regulatory organization, notwithstanding that such Rule,
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had inquired of the Commission before he exercised his stock option as
to whether he was an officer within the meaning of section 16(a) of the
1934 Act and the Commission, by way of reply, had referred Rathman
to rule 3b-2. Rathman, in response, noted that he did not perform for
Lockheed functions normally entrusted to an officer specifically named
in the rule. Accordingly, he did not comply with the filing requirement
of section 16(a). Judge Byrne also referred to Rathman's participation
in the Lockheed stock option plan, from which Lockheed had excluded
its president, vice-president and treasurer because of a belief that they
were subject to section 16(b), as additional evidence that Rathman had
participated in the plan in the good faith belief that he was not an
officer of Lockheed. 45 It is submitted that Rathman's "good faith"
defense would have been considerably weakened if, at the time of
Rathman's exercise of his option in 1950, the Commission had already
stated, as it did in its 1952 Securities Exchange Act Release 4754,46
that the meaning of officer must ultimately be determined by the courts
and not by rule 3b-2.
In Campbell, Lockheed sued Campbell, an assistant secretary and an
assistant treasurer of Lockheed, under section 16(b) to recover
Campbell's profits derived from his sale of Lockheed stock and his
subsequent purchase of Lockheed stock pursuant to the exercise of a
stock option granted Campbell under a Lockheed stock option plan for
compensating key employees. 4 7 No mention was made by Chief Judge
Yankwich in his opinion as to whether this was the same stock option
plan under which Rathman was granted an option, and no argument
was made by Campbell that he had in good faith relied on rule 3b-2 to
determine his status as an officer of Lockheed.
The court chose not to rely on either the Rathman or Colby decisions
to determine whether Campbell was an officer. Rather, while upholding the validity of rule 3b-2, the Judge viewed the question as to
whether Campbell was an officer as "purely one of fact."' 48 In finding
that Campbell was not an officer for purposes of section 16(b) of the
1934 Act, the Judge examined Campbell's functions, including his
responsibility for policy making. The court concluded:
[W]hether we adopt the subjective test suggested in Colby v. Klune, ...
namely, an
inside position in which possibility of securing valuable advance information of
Regulation, or Order may thereafter be amended or rescinded or determined by judicial or other
authority to be invalid for any reason." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78w(a)(1) (Supp. 4, Aug. 1975), amending
15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970).
45. 106 F. Supp. at 814.
46. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754 (Sept. 24, 1952).
47. 110 F. Supp. at 283.
48. Id. at 284.
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possible fluctuations in stock, or the objective test of the regulation, i.e., performance
of acts similar to those performed by the enumerated officers, the conclusion must be
that the defendant [Campbell] did not perform duties conformable to those of the
treasurer or secretary except in the minor function of executing, on rare occasions,
instruments required to be executed by those officers for and on behalf of the company.
And, while he may have had the title of "Manager of the Financial Department," in
reality, he did not concern himself with financial policy at all. He was merely an able
administrative officer handling a large group of men who were performing the
mechanics incidental to the accounting and bookkeeping of a large concern.
Determination of financial policy, either in a direct or consultative way, was outside
his province. Under the circumstances, he cannot be said to be an "officer" within the
meaning of the interdiction of the statute.4 9

While supporting the validity of rule 3b-2, the court applied the Colby
criteria in determining that Campbell was not an officer for purposes
of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.
III.

SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEANING
OF "OFFICER!'

The next reported case involving the meaning of officer for purposes
of the 1934 Act was not decided until 1968, more than fifteen years
after the Campbell decision. That case, Lee National Corp. v. Segur,5 0
as all the judicial decisions in this area, involved the interpretation of
officer for purposes of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.
In Lee National, the court held that Segur, an officer of plaintiff's
subsidiary, was not an "officer of the 'issuer' " (the plaintiff) and,
therefore, was not subject to section 16(b) of the 1934 ActL5 1 Plaintiffs
counsel had sought a judicial determination that when section 16 of the
1934 Act refers to an "officer of the issuer" it "intends to also refer to
and include an officer of a subsidiary corporation." 5 2 The court found
that this construction of section 16 of the 1934 Act had not been
adopted by any court and concluded that such a construction "need not
be accomplished by what may be considered 'judicial legislation.' ",s3
In a 1971 no action letter, Associated Bank & Services, Inc.,5 4 the
Commission responded to a request to comment on whether officers
and directors of three wholly owned bank subsidiaries should file with
the Commission reports pursuant to section 16(a) of the 1934 Act. In
the aggregate, the subsidiaries had in excess of seventy-five officers and
directors. The subsidiaries were owned by a bank holding company.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 286.
281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Id.at 852.
Id.
Id.
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

78,334, at 80,779 (SEC 1971).
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The president of each of the subsidiary banks was a director of the
bank holding company. Counsel for the banks contended that the bulk
of the responsibility for operating the subsidiaries lay with the holding
company and its officers and directors. Thus, the banks maintained
that, with the exception of those persons holding positions with both
the subsidiary bank and the holding company, the personnel of the
subsidiary banks performed predominantly administrative rather than
policy-making functions.5s
Unlike the court in Lee National, the Commission was not entirely
certain whether officers and directors of the subsidiaries were officers
or directors subject to section 16(a) reporting requirements. The Commission stated in its letter to counsel that the "ultimate determination
of whether they are or are not insiders for the purposes of Section 16(a)
reporting must be made by the courts."'5 6 The Commission then
referred counsel to Colby's confidential information test for an officer.
Apparently, the Commission ignored the holding of the Lee National
court that an officer of a subsidiary was not subject to section 16(b)
liability.5 7 Only after the Commission warned that the courts must
make the ultimate determination as to who is an officer for section
16(a) reporting purposes, did it state:
You state that it is your feeling that the personnel of the subsidiary banks have more
administrative functions rather than policy-making responsibilities. Consequently, this

office is not inclined to insist that the officers and directors of the subsidiary bank file
Section 16(a) reports. This, of course, excludes the three Presidents of the banks who
are Directors of the holding company, as well as any subsidiary bank employee who is
a director or officer of the issuer. This should not, however, be construed as a
determination by the Commission that the officers and directors of subsidiary banks
are not subject to the reporting requirements of Section 16(a).18

It is submitted that the Commission's reply in Associated Bank &
Services, Inc. contains an erroneous view of the filing requirements of
section 16(a) of the 1934 Act, inasmuch as the statute clearly refers to
an "officer of the issuer"5 9 and not to an officer of an issuer's subsidiary.
Unlike Colby, where the defendant Klune did not hold an officer's
title, the defendants in court decisions after Lee National all held
officer titles in the issuer but denied that they were "officers" for
purposes of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. In each case the defendants
55.

Id. at 80,780.

56. Id. at 80,779.
57. 281 F. Supp. at 852.
58. Associated Bank & Servs., Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
78,334, at 80,780 (SEC 1971).

59.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
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attempted to use some or all of the Colby criteria to contest their officer
status under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. In other words, in Colby a
subjective test was formulated by the Second Circuit to impose section
16(b) liability upon persons who objectively do not appear to be
officers of an issuer. In recent cases, however, persons objectively
identifiable as officers of the issuer have attempted to use the Colby
criteria to avoid section 16(b) liability. The first of these decisions was
Gold v. Scurlock, 60 in which the plaintiff sued on behalf of the
Susquehanna Corporation for short-swing profits which the plaintiff
alleged were realized by defendant directors and officers of Susquehanna in violation of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. The defendants
had been directors and officers of Atlantic Research Corporation and
had merged Atlantic into Susquehanna, exchanging their Atlantic
stock for that of Susquehanna. Within six months, defendants sold
shares of their newly acquired Susquehanna stock. The district court
found that the exchange of stock pursuant to the merger constituted a
"purchase" under section 16(b) so that the sale of Susquehanna stock
within a less than six month period subjected all defendants but one to
61
section 16(b) liability.
This defendant, Rumbel, contended that although he held an
officer's tifle in Susquehanna, he was not an officer for section 16(b)
purposes inasmuch as his office was titular and did not accord him
access to inside information. The court found that Rumbel was not an
officer and not subject to section 16(b) liability: "Being a corporate
officer without portfolio does not per se make him an 'insider' as
contemplated in Section 16(b)-and the Court so finds as to Rumbel." '62 Two other defendants, Sloane and McBride, asserted that,
though they held officer titles, they were not officers for purposes of
section 16(b). The court, however, found that they were within the
section since "[t]heir duties and responsibilities were equal to their
63

titles."

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, in determining whether the merger
was a "purchase" for section 16(b) purposes, rejected the district
court's characterization of the merger as a "garden-variety" purchase
under section 16(b). 64 Instead, the Fourth Circuit held the merger to be
an "unorthodox transaction" 6 s within the ambit of the Supreme
60.
nor.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd in part on other grounds and rev'd in part sub
Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
Id.at 1215.
Id.
Id.
486 F.2d at 351.
Id.at 343.
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Court's decision in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. 66 The court examined each defendant's opportunity for speculative abuse of inside information obtained as a result of the merger in
order to determine whether the exchange of shares was a "purchase"
67
within the meaning of section 16(b).
In the case of Rumbel, the Fourth Circuit found that he did not
have the slightest connection with merger negotiations and that he was
as ignorant of merger developments as any outside stockholder. Thus,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Rumbel's exchange of shares lacked
the potential for misuse of inside information. On that basis, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that Rumbel was
68
not subject to section 16(b) liability.
Concerning Sloane (McBride did not appeal), the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court and directed the lower court to enter
judgment in Sloane's favor. 69 The district court had found specifically
that there was no evidence indicating that Sloane had an opportunity
to avail himself of the inside details of the merger arrangement, but
that, since his duties and responsibilities were equal to his title (vicepresident), he was subject to section 16(b) liability. The Fourth Circuit
stated: "And when the District Court found, as the evidence clearly
warranted, that Sloane had no such opportunity,'70 a conclusion of
nonliability on Sloane's part necessarily followed.
Analysis of this case is somewhat complicated by the fact that it
involved an unorthodox transaction. It would seem, however, that the
district court applied a subjective test similar to that used by the
Second Circuit in Colby since the district court inquired into the
defendants' duties as well as their corporate titles. 7 1 The Fourth
Circuit, on the other hand, emphasizing the Kern County decision and
the unorthodox nature of the merger, focused on whether the merger
presented the defendants with an opportunity for speculative abuse of
inside information. 72 Thus, the Fourth Circuit applied a transactional
test, rather than the Colby criteria, to determine section 16(b) liability.
The district court decision, however, illustrates the continuing tendency of the courts to apply the Colby criteria to section 16(b) cases.
66.

411 U.S. 582 (1973).

67. 486 F.2d at 344.
68. Id.at 351.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Schimmel v. Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); text accompanying
notes 73-86 infra.
72. See Dietz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 Fordham L,
Rev. 1, 25 (1974).
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In Schimmel v. Goldman,7 3 Judge Bauman approved a stipulation
of settlement discontinuing a section 16(b) action in return for the
defendant Goldman's payment of approximately 72 percent of the maximum possible recovery. 74 The Commission submitted an amicus curiae
memorandum opposing the settlement on the ground that the defenses
to the section 16(b) action were insufficient to justify the substantial
7 5
discount in the settlement proposal.
Defendant Goldman, a vice-president of Banner Industries, Inc.,
had sold Banner shares and had exercised an option to purchase
Banner shares within less than six months. Judge Bauman computed
Goldman's "maximum profit" under section 16(b) to be $83,490.80.
The defendants had offered $60,000.00 in settlement of the case.
Goldman, in support of the settlement, claimed that the recoverable
profits would be limited to $40,365.80 due to special rules for computing profits in cases involving exercise of stock options.7 6 Additionally,
notwithstanding the fact that Goldman listed himself as a vice-president of Banner Industries, Inc. in Form 4 reports filed with the
Commission, he claimed that his position was merely titular and that,
consequently, he was not an officer for purposes of section 16(b)."
As to this claim, the Commission, in its amicus curiae memorandum, opposed Goldman's position, arguing that if a" 'person wishes to
enjoy the prestige of an office, he shares its responsibilities under
Section 16.' ",78 The Commission argued that the definition of officer in
rule 3b-2 foreclosed any inquiry into the nature of Goldman's duties
with Banner Industries, Inc. The court noted that the Commission's
position was inconsistent with its stance in Colby where it did not
argue that rule 3b-2 foreclosed any inquiry into what the defendant
did, but rather, asserted that "it is significant that the employee has or
has not 'responsibility for the policy of at least a substantial segment of
the corporation's affairs' and participates 'in executive councils of the
corporation as an officer.' "79 The court further stated:
Thus, neither the Second Circuit nor the SEC [in Colby] were willing to assume that
Rule 3b-2 foreclosed the defendant from arguing that, although given the title of an

officer, he did not perform the policy making functions or have access to inside
information which characterize an "officer" for purposes of § 16(b).3 0
73.
74.

57 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 487.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

1973).

482-83.
483-84.
485.
486, quoting Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1949).
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The court considered the validity of rule 3b-2 but found no decision in
the Second Circuit which had discussed this point subsequent to the
1949 Colby decision. Judge Bauman found the Rathman and Campbell
decisions, 8 1 holding rule 3b-2 valid, to be "of little precedential value
because the issue in each case was whether an assistant treasurer, a
position not included in the Rule's definition of 'officer,' was an insider
for purposes of § 16(b)."' 82 He referred to the district court decision in
Gold v. Scurlock, 83 in which the district court for the Eastern District
of Virginia did make an inquiry into the defendants' duties as well as
their corporate titles. 8 4 Judge Bauman elected to follow the Colby rule,
concluding that "defendant Goldman would be free at trial to raise the
issue of whether he was an insider despite [his filing] the Form 4
reports and Rule 3b-2."8 5
After finding that Goldman's defenses, if successful, would defeat
any recovery by the corporation, Judge Bauman approved the settlement as fair and reasonable. Clearly, an element of this ruling was the
likelihood of plaintiff's success at trial should he argue the Colby
rule. 86
In Selas Corp. of America v. Voogd, 87 the defendant Voogd was
executive vice-president of the plaintiff, Selas Corporation of America.
He was also "one of the more active members of the executive
committee, and . . . was the chief operating officer of the most
important section of plaintiffs business which, at that time, was
producing most of the profits for Selas."18 8 The defendant admitted that
he had engaged in the short-swing transaction alleged by plaintiff but
denied that he was liable under section 16(b) for any profit, claiming
that he was not an officer of Selas within the meaning of the section.
On plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, Judge Gorbey held
Voogd to be liable under section 16(b) on the ground that, not only was
he an officer under rule 3b-2's definition of officer, but he also fulfilled
all the Colby criteria for officer inasmuch as an examination of his
81. These decisions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-49 supra.
82. 57 F.R.D. at 486. Judge Bauman's dismissal of the Rathman and Campbell decisions on
the ground that the position of assistant treasurer was not included in rule 3b-2's enumerated
officer titles overlooked basic principles of administrative law supporting these holdings. See note
116 infra. In the author's view, Judge Bauman's statement should be limited to section 16(b) and
should not be applied to rule 3b-2 when it is used to define officer for purposes of other
provisions of the 1934 Act.
83. This case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 60-72 supra.
84. 57 F.R.D. at 486.
85. Id.
86. Id.at 487.
87. 365 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
88. Id.at 1271.
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duties showed that he took responsibility for a substantial segment of
Selas' business affairs and that he participated in the executive councils
of Selas. 8 9 Judge Gorbey concluded that Voogd's duties were of such a
character that "it cannot be said that he did not have access to inside
information as contemplated by § 16(b) of the Act." 90
In Morales v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 9 1 the most recent case concerning the meaning of officer under the 1934 Act, a vice-president of
Holiday Inns, Inc. was unable to convince the court that he was not an
officer for purposes of section 16(b). The defendant contended that
although he was listed in corporate records and Commission filings as
a vice-president, he was not an officer within the meaning of section
16(b). Judge Gurfein, in weighing the defendant's argument, referred
to the Colby decision, noting that "our Court of Appeals has put a
gloss on the meaning of 'officer' for 16(b) purposes." 92 Without considering the question whether rule 3b-2 was valid, the court relied on the
Colby test dealing with the likelihood of obtaining confidential information to determine whether the defendant was an officer for section
16(b) purposes. Judge Gurfein noted that the defendant's answers to
interrogatories "indicate that Jones [the defendant], concededly a
Vice-President, was Director of Inn Operations, and as such had
access to information concerning both the financial and operational
performance of the Company-owned inns which comprised twenty
percent of all the Holiday Inns. ' 93 Judge Gurfein concluded:
There can be little doubt that in this position Jones may well have been in a position to
acquire important information relating to the business of the corporation "which would
aid him... in personal market transactions." His "defense," aside from Rule 3b-2,
could not be sustained under Colby v. Klune, supra. Jones' title was not honorific. The
settlement was, therefore, one of which the Court would not have approved had it
94
been presented under Rule 23.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In determining who is an "officer of an issuer" for purposes of
section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, counsel would be better advised to use
the Colby criteria, 95 and not rely on the enumerated titles and literal
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
366 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Id. at 762.
Id. at 763.
Id.

95. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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terms of rule 3b-2. This conclusion would appear to be justified in light
of the fact that the cases decided subsequent to the 1953 Campbell
decision 96 (with the exception of Lee National)97 were guided by the
Colby opinion in making such determination.
Additionally, as a result of the Commission's no-action letter, Associated Bank & Services, Inc., 98 which stated that the ultimate
determination as to who is an officer for purposes of filing reports
under section 16(a) must be made by the courts, counsel may not safely
rely on rule 3b-2 to determine officer status for the purpose of filing
section 16(a) reports, but must again refer to the Colby criteria for
guidance.
As for provisions of the 1934 Act other than section 16, the Commission, in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754,99 cast doubt on the
use of rule 3b-2 for determining the meaning of officer. In that release
the Commission noted that the Colby opinion "indicates the possibility
that the provisions of the [1934] Act applicable to officers may be held
to reach a broader class of persons than might otherwise appear from
the definition contained in rule X-3B-2."' 100
As a result of the Commission's view that the ultimate determination
of who is an officer for purposes of the 1934 Act must be made by the
courts, individuals attempting to determine whether to file with the
Commission Form 3 and 4 reports under section 16(a) of the 1934 Act,
and corporations attempting to determine whether to file with the
Commission registration statements under section 12 of the Act, 10 1
reports under sections 13102 or 15(d)10 3 of the 1934 Act, and proxy
material under section 14 of the 1934 Act,1 0 4 are in an unhappy
position. No assurance can be offered them that they are immune
under section 23(a)(1) l0 s from 1934 Act liability if they rely on rule
3b-2 to determine officer status. The argument against granting immunity would be that such reliance is not within the good faith
96. The Campbell decision is discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-49 supra.
97. The Lee National decision is discussed in the text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
98. The Commission's no-action letter is discussed in the text accompanying notes 54-59
supra.
99. Release No. 4754 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
100. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4754 (Sept. 24, 1952) (emphasis added).
101.
15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
102. Id. § 78m (1970).

103. Id. § 78o(d) (1970).
104. Id. § 78n (1970).
105. Section 23(aX1) of the 1934 Act, which is set out in note 44 supra, provides that no
liability shall be imposed for acts done or omitted in good faith in conformity with rules and
regulations of the Commission.
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provision of section 23(a)(1) of the 1934 Act since the Commission itself
is not relying on the rule but,06instead, is leaving determination of who
is an officer to the courts.1
Under section 3(b) of the 1934 Act, the Commission was granted by
Congress the power "by rules and regulations to define technical,
trade, accounting, and other terms used in this chapter [1934 Act],
consistently with the provisions and purposes of this chapter." 0 7 Both
Rathman and Campbell'"8 found rule 3b-2 to be validly issued by the
Commission pursuant to the authority granted it by Congress under
section 3(b) of the Act. However, since section 16(b) was enacted "[flor
the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by [a statutory insider] by reason of his relationship to [an]
issuer,"' 1 9 it is understandable that the courts have not relied on the rule
3b-2 definition of officer to determine whether a corporate employee is an
officer of an issuer for purposes of section 16(b). Instead the courts have
followed the Colby criteria in making such determination.
As the Supreme Court noted in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co.: 1 10 "[Wlhere alternative constructions of the terms of
§ 16(b) are possible, those terms are to be given the construction that
best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders.""' To support this statement, the Court,
referred, among other cases, to the Colby decision: "And in deciding
whether an investor is an 'officer' or 'director' within the meaning of
§ 16(b), courts have allowed proof that the investor performed the
or director even though not formally denomifunctions of an ' officer
2
nated as such." "
In the author's view, the definition of officer in rule 3b-2 is deficient
in failing to take into account Colby and other more recent court
interpretations of the meaning of officer for purposes of section 16(b).
106. Compare B.T. Babbit, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964) with Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
107. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(b) (Supp. 4, Aug. 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1970)
(emphasis added). Congress deleted a draft provision that the Commission's power to define terms
was to have the "force of law" insofar as it was not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1934 Act.
The provision was deleted as unnecessary since courts commonly give the force of law to
administrative interpretations of statutory terms unless they are clearly inconsistent with the
21,254.10 (1975).
legislative intent. 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
108.

These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 39-49 supra. See also note 82

supra and accompanying text.
109.
110.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
404 U.S. 418 (1972).

111.
112.

Id.at 424.
Id. at 424 n.4, citing Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
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It is submitted that the rule should not be relied upon by corporate
personnel in determining whether they are officers under section 16(b).
In light of the Commission's reply in Associated Bank & Services,
Inc., 11 3 referring counsel to the Colby case and its confidential information test in order to determine whether an employee must report
under section 16(a), rule 3b-2 fails to alert employees of the need to
consider Colby in making such determination. In addition, rule 3b-2
appears to be too narrow in scope to implement effectively the policing
114
function of section 16(a).
As for the other provisions of the 1934 Act, the Commission should
support the validity of its rule 3b-2 definition of officer. It is submitted
that the word officer is being used in such other provisions in its
ordinary corporate law meaning of an individual holding a corporate
title or performing functions similar to those usually performed by an
officer holding a title enumerated in the rule, such as president, vicepresident, treasurer, secretary, etc. Accordingly, the Commission
should reconsider its position set forth in Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 4754115 in which the Commission left to the courts the
ultimate determination of who is an officer for all provisions of the
1934 Act. The Commission should declare that rule 3b-2 is valid for
purposes of the provisions of the 1934 Act, other than section 16 of the
Act, since the rule appears not to be inconsistent with these provisions
and is clearly within the authority granted the Commission by Congress.' 1 6 Such a declaration would: (i) remove uncertainty as to the
113. See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
114. It has been noted that in regard to reporting beneficial ownership of securities for
purposes of section 16(a) of the 1934 Act: "The reporting requirements of § 16(a) are broader in
scope than the liability provisions of § 16(b); changes in beneficial ownership within a six-month
period, such as transfer of shares whether by gift or for consideration to a spouse or other family
member, although duly reported may not always give rise to liability.. .. The Commission has
supported broad interpretations of the reporting requirements, reasoning that Congress intended
the trading activities of insiders to be subject to the most careful scrutiny, for its deterrent effect
not only upon abuse of inside information for short-swing profit, but also upon other abuses to
which other sections of the statute are more specifically directed." Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,923, at 97,176 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd,
Civil No. 75-7106 (2d Cir., Sept. 22, 1975) (citation omitted).
115. Release No. 4754 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
116. A regulation which is issued pursuant to a grant of statutory authority, if not inconsistent with the statute, is valid and has the force of law. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 5.04, at 252-56 (Supp. 1970); see United States v. California Portland Cement Co., 413 F.2d
161, 164 (9th Cir. 1969) (treasury regulations). Accordingly, since rule 3b-2 was issued by the
Commission pursuant to the authority granted it by the Congress under section 3(b) of the 1934
Act and since the rule appears not to be inconsistent with provisions of the 1934 Act other than
section 16, rule 3b-2 should be valid for such other provisions. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282, 286 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106
F. Supp. 810, 813-14 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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validity of rule 3b-2 when applied to provisions of the 1934 Act other
than section 16; (ii) facilitate corporate administrative compliance with
these provisions; and (iii) permit corporations subject to the provisions
of the 1934 Act to rely in good faith on rule 3b-2 for purposes of these
provisions, thereby protecting them from 1934
Act liability by virtue of
117
the good faith provision of section 23(a).
Concerning section 16 of the 1934 Act, the Commission should adopt
a new rule defining officer solely for purposes of that section. 18 This
definition, consistent with the Commission's view that employees must
consider Colby in determining whether to report under section 16(a)
and consistent with the policing purpose of the section, would broaden
the scope of the definition of officer as contained in rule 3b-2 by adding
to that definition a new provision incorporating the Colby criteria. It is
suggested that the new rule could read as follows:
For purposes of the provisions of Section 16 of the 1934 Act, the term "officer" means:

(a) a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller and any other person
who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers; and (b) any other person
performing executive duties of such character for an issuer that such person would be
likely, in discharging these duties, to obtain confidential information about the issuer's
affairs that would aid such person if such person engaged in market transactions with
the issuer's equity securities. A person shall be deemed to perform executive duties as
described in (b) so as to require compliance with the filing provisions of Section 16(a) of
the 1934 Act if such person: (i) has responsibility for the policy of at least a substantial
segment of an issuer's affairs; or, (ii) participates in the executive councils of the issuer.

By adopting a new definition of officer for purposes of section 16, the
Commission could bring reporting under section 16(a) of the 1934 Act
into line with the criteria used by the courts in determining the
meaning of officer under section 16(b). 1 19 The definition will have the
additional benefit of enabling corporate personnel to rely on the
definition in good faith in determining whether or not they are officers
for purposes of the provisions of section 16, thereby granting them
immunity for "any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with
117. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78w(a)(1) (Supp. 4, Aug. 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970), set
out in note 44 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 31-38 supra.
119. Admittedly, revision of the definition of officer for section 16 purposes will introduce
an element of indefinitiveness into the reporting provisions of section 16(a), but, in the author's

view, corporate personnel must, in any event, consider the Colby criteria for purposes of
determining whether to engage in six-month trading activity proscribed by section 16(b).
In line with the proposed amendment set out in the text, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
may wish to consider amending their definition of officer for purposes of section 16 of the 1934
Act. These agencies' present definition of officer is set out in note 9 supra.
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". Finally, the
a rule, regulation, or order of the Commission ..
introduction of the subjective officer criteria of Colby into a section 16
definition of officer, while retaining rule 3b-2 for other provisions of the
1934 Act, should have the salutary effect of limiting Colby and its progeny
to section 16 of the 1934 Act.
120. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78w(a)(1) (Supp. 4, Aug. 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970), set
out in note 44 supra.

